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Abstract
This paper surveys developments in probabilistic inductive inference (learning) of recursive
(computable) functions. We mainly focus on )nite learning, since this simple paradigm has
produced the most interesting (and most complex) results. c© 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All
rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Understanding the process of learning has always fascinated scientists. There are
several computational theories of learning. One of the oldest theories is inductive in-
ference established by Gold [15]. This theory considers the process of learning from a
viewpoint of the computability theory. Unlike other theories of learning (for example,
PAC-learning [36, 20]), inductive inference does not make probabilistic assumptions
about the world. However, probabilistic algorithms appear in inductive inference and
the study of probabilistic inductive inference creates a lot of interesting problems with
elements of both computability theory and combinatorics. In this paper, we survey
some of these problems.
We start with a general introduction to inductive inference. Learning can be consid-
ered as a process of gathering information about an unknown object, processing this
information and obtaining a description of the unknown object. Ideally, we would like
to obtain a complete description of the object.
In the theory of inductive inference, objects are arbitrary recursive (computable)
functions (or recursively enumerable languages). The reason is that any algorithmic
behavior can be represented as a recursive (computable) function and, hence, we obtain
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a model that includes any learning situation. Throughout this paper, we only consider
learning of total recursive functions (except Section 8 where we consider recursively
enumerable languages).
The natural data about a function f are its values f(0); f(1); f(2); : : : and the natural
representation of these data is the sequence 〈0; f(0)〉; 〈1; f(1)〉; 〈2; f(2)〉; : : : . The most
general type of description for a computable function is a program in a universal
programming language. Any other description can be converted to this form.
This gives us the following learning model. A learning algorithm receives the values
of an unknown function f in the natural order: 〈0; f(0)〉; 〈1; f(1)〉; 〈2; f(2)〉; : : : and
produces a program h. The algorithm succeeds on f if the program h computes f.
We will compare the classes of functions identi)able by probabilistic algorithms with
diCerent probabilities of correct answer.
2. Denitions
Next, we introduce the formal notation and de)nitions used in this paper. For more
background information, see [32] for recursive function (computability) theory, [33, 24]
for set theory and [5, 29] for inductive inference.
A learning machine is an algorithmic device that reads values of a function f:
f(0); f(1); : : : . Having seen )nitely many values of the function it can output a conjec-
ture. A conjecture is a program in some )xed acceptable programming system [25, 32].
It makes sense to allow the learning machine to revise its conjecture. In this case, the
last conjecture output by the algorithm should be correct but intermediate conjectures
may be wrong. This increases the power of the learning algorithm. Also, this can be
motivated by the fact that humans learning a complex behavior (for example, foreign
language or driving), do not learn it completely at once. Rather, they )rst learn a
part of it, then extend it by learning more. This model where an unlimited number of
conjectures is allowed is called learning in the limit [15].
Denition 1 (Gold [15]). (a) A deterministic learning machine M EX-identi)es (iden-
ti)es in the limit) a function f if, given f(0); f(1); : : : it outputs a sequence of
programs h0; h1; : : : such that, for some i, hi = hi+1 = hi+2 = · · · and hi is a program
computing f.
(b) M EX-identi)es a set of functions U if it EX-identi)es all f∈U .
(c) EX denotes the set of all sets U that are EX-identi)able.
A model where only one conjecture is allowed and it must be correct has been
studied as well. This model is called )nite learning. It is more restricted and (in most
contexts) simpler.
Denition 2 (Gold [15]). (a) A deterministic learning machine M )nitely identi)es
(FIN-identi)es) a function f if, receiving f(0); f(1); : : : as the input, it produces a
program computing function f.
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(b) M FIN-identi)es a set of functions U if it FIN-identi)es any function f∈U .
(c) A set of functions U is called FIN-identi)able if there exists a deterministic
learning machine that identi)es U . The collection of all FIN-identi)able sets is denoted
by FIN.
The problems that we consider are fairly simple for probabilistic learning in the
limit (cf. [30, 31, 34]) but are much more complicated (and more interesting) for )nite
learning. Therefore, in this survey, we focus on )nite learning. References to work on
other models of inductive inference are given in Sections 8 and 9. Next, we de)ne
identi)cation by probabilistic machines. We de)ne it for FIN but the de)nition carries
over to EX and other paradigms as well.
Denition 3. (a) A probabilistic learning machine M 〈p〉FIN-identi)es (FIN-identi)es
with probability p) the set of functions U if, for any function f∈U the probability
that M FIN-identi)es f is atleast p.
(b) The collection of all 〈p〉FIN-identi)able sets is denoted by 〈p〉FIN.
Team identi2cation is another idea closely related to probabilistic identi)cation.
A team is just a )nite set of learning machines {M1; M2; : : : ; Ms}.
Denition 4. (a) A team M [r; s]FIN-identi)es the function f if atleast r of learning
machines M1; : : : ; Ms FIN-identify f.
(b) The collection of all [r; s]FIN-identi)able sets is denoted by [r; s]FIN.
It is easy to see that [r; s]FIN⊆〈 rs 〉FIN. (Just choose one of the machines in the
team uniformly at random and simulate.) In some cases, the opposite is also true and
every probabilistic machine can be simulated by a team.
The main goal of research in probabilistic inductive inference is determining how
〈p〉FIN depends on the accepting probability p. Formally, it means describing the
probability hierarchy.
Denition 5. The probability hierarchy for FIN is the set of all points p such that
there is U ∈ 〈p〉FIN but U =∈ 〈p+ 〉FIN for ¿0.
3. Explicit results for FIN
Probabilistic FIN-identi)cation was )rst studied by Freivalds [14]. He showed that
any probabilistic learning machine with the probability of correct answer above 23
can be replaced by an equivalent deterministic machine. He also characterized the
probability hierarchy for FIN between 12 and
2
3 .
Theorem 1 (Freivalds [14]). (a) If p¿ 23 ; then 〈p〉FIN=FIN.
(b) 〈 23 〉FIN = FIN.
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(c) If n=(2n − 1)¿p¿(n + 1)=(2n + 1); then 〈p〉FIN= 〈n=(2n − 1)〉FIN
= [n; 2n− 1]FIN.
(d) 〈(n+ 1)=(2n+ 1)〉FIN = 〈n=(2n− 1)〉FIN.
It also makes sense to consider probabilistic algorithms with the probability of cor-
rect answer 12 and below because there are in)nitely many outputs and, hence, even
designing an algorithm that gives the correct answer with probability  (for an arbitrar-
ily small )xed ¿0) may be nontrivial. Here, the )rst result was a surprising discovery
that a “2 out of 4” team is more powerful than a “1 out of 2” team.
Theorem 2 (Jain et al. [18]). (a) There is a set of functions U such that U ∈ [2; 4]FIN
but U =∈ [1; 2]FIN.
(b) [1; 2]FIN= [3; 6]FIN= [5; 10]FIN= · · · and [2; 4]FIN= [4; 8]FIN=
[6; 12]FIN= · · · .
(c) 〈 12 〉FIN= [2; 4]FIN.
We see that the power of a team depends not only on the ratio of machines that
must succeed but also on the number of machines in the team.
The next step was moving below probability 12 .
Theorem 3 (Daley et al. [12]). Let p0 = 12 ; p1 =
24
49 ; p2 =
20
41 ; p3 =
18
37 ; p4 =
17
35 . Then;
for all i∈{0; 1; 2; 3}:
(a) For all x∈ [pi+1; pi]; 〈x〉FIN= 〈pi〉FIN; and
(b) 〈pi〉FIN = 〈pi+1〉FIN.
Each of these cutpoints was proven separately and there seemed to be no formula
or unifying proof argument connecting them. It took several years to obtain a more
general result.
Theorem 4 (Daley and Kalyanasundaram [10]). The probability hierarchy for FIN in
the interval [ 1225 ;
1
2 ] is {(12m− 16)=(25m− 34) |m¿2}∪ { 2449 ; 2041 ; 1735 ; 1531 ; 2756}.
Thus, it appeared that there was a formula ((12m− 16)=(25m− 34)) and a general
argument for this interval. It only was obscured by exceptions from this formula at the
beginning. With probabilities getting smaller, progress became more and more diNcult.
The full proof of Theorem 4 was more than 100 pages long. On the other hand, it
only described the situation for the interval [ 1225 ;
1
2 ].
4. Explicit results for PFIN
One of the approaches to this situation was considering Popperian FINite identi)ca-
tion(PFIN), a restricted version of FIN. FIN allows two types of errors on functions
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that are not identi)ed by a machine. These are
1. Errors of commission: The program output by a machine M produces a value
diCerent from the value of the input function.
2. Errors of omission: The program output by M does not halt on some input.
Errors of omission are ones that cause most trouble. The reason is that, given a program
h output by a machine M , we cannot tell whether h halts on input x. If we eliminate
them, the model becomes simpler and still remains interesting.
Denition 6 (Minicozzi [27]). A learning machine M is Popperian if it does not make
errors of omission (i.e., if all conjectures on all inputs are programs computing total
functions).
Denition 7. (a) A set of functions U is PFIN-identi)able if there is a Popperian
machine M that FIN-identi)es U .
(b) PFIN denotes the collection of all PFIN-identi)able sets.
Probabilistic and team PFIN-identi)cation are introduced similarly. It is important
that the requirement about learners outputting only programs computing total recursive
functions is absolute, i.e.,
1. All conjectures of all machines in a PFIN-team must be programs computing total
recursive functions.
2. A probabilistic PFIN-machine is not allowed to output a program which does not
compute a total recursive function even with a very small probability.
Daley et al. [10, 8] proved counterparts of Theorems 1–3 for PFIN. The situation
for probabilities greater than or equal to 12 was precisely the same as for FIN, only the
proofs became simpler. For probabilities smaller than 12 , two sequences of points where
the power of probabilistic machines changed were discovered. The )rst, 4n=(9n − 2),
started at 1225 and converged to
4
9 .
Theorem 5 (Daley et al. [11]). (a) The probability hierarchy for PFIN in the interval
[ 12 ; 1] is {n=(2n− 1) | n¿1}.
(b) The probability hierarchy for PFIN in the interval [ 49 ;
1
2 ] is {4n=(9n−2) | n¿2}.
The second sequence was more complicated. It was actually a union of three simpler
sequences corresponding to three diCerent ways of how machines in a team can behave.
Theorem 6 (Daley and Kalyanasundaram [8]). The probability hierarchy for PFIN in
the interval [ 37 ;
4
9 ] is {6n=(14n−3) | n¿6}∪ {3n=(7n−1) | n¿12}∪ {8n=(19n−4) | 46
n611}.
However, even for Popperian learning, things were getting more complicated as the
probabilities decreased (this can be observed both by just comparing the sequences of
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probabilities in Theorems 5 and 6 and by looking at the arguments that were used to
prove these theorems). As result of that, Daley and Kalyanasundaram [8] wrote that
the prospects of determining all cutpoints are bleak even for the interval [ 25 ;
1
2 ].
5. General results for PFIN
An alternative approach was proposed in [1]. Instead of trying to )nd all cutpoints
explicitly, [1] focused on studying the general properties of the whole probability
structure.
The )rst step was describing existing diagonalization constructions (i.e., constructions
proving that there is U ∈ 〈p〉PFIN such that U =∈ 〈p + 〉PFIN for ¿0) in a general
form.
Theorem 7 (Ambainis, Kummer [1, 22]). Let PPFIN be the probability hierarchy for
PFIN and p1; : : : ; ps ∈PPFIN. Let p∈ [0; 1]. If there are q1¿0; : : : ; qs¿0 such that
1. q1 + q2 + · · ·+ qs=p;
2.
p
qi + 1− p =pi for i=1; : : : ; s;
then p∈PPFIN.
This led to a conjecture that PPFIN is equal to the set A de)ned as follows.
1. 1∈A.
2. If p1; p2; : : : ; ps ∈A and p∈ [0; 1] is such that there exist q1; : : : ; qs ∈ [0; 1] satisfying
(a) q1 + q2 + · · ·+ qs=p;
(b)
p
qi + 1− p =pi for i=1; : : : ; s,
then p∈A.
Indeed, A=PPFIN and the )rst step in proving that was observing some structural
properties of this set.
Denition 8 (Sierpinski [33] and Kuratowski and Mostovski [24]). A set A is well-
ordered if there is no in)nite strictly increasing sequence of elements of A. A set A is
well-ordered in decreasing order if there is no in)nite strictly increasing sequence of
elements of A.
Fig. 1 shows the known parts of probability hierarchies for EX, FIN and PFIN. It
is easy to see that all are well-ordered in decreasing order. The set A de)ned above is
well-ordered as well.
Theorem 8 (Ambainis [1]). The set A is well-ordered in decreasing order and has a
system of notations.
A system of notations is an algorithmic description for a well-ordered set. It allows
to )nd preceding elements, given one element. This notion was introduced by Kleene
for constructive ordinals [21] and extended to sets of reals (like A) in [1]. Well-
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Fig. 1. The probability hierarchies for EX, FIN and PFIN.
orderedness is crucial because it allows to use induction over elements of the set A.
Having the system of notations is important to make this induction algorithmic. Using
well-orderedness and system of notations, [1] showed the following result.
Theorem 9 (Ambainis [1]). Let p∈A and p′¡p be such that there is no p′′ ∈A
with p′6p′′¡p. Then; 〈p〉PFIN= 〈p′〉PFIN.
Corollary 1 (Ambainis [1]). A=PPFIN.
This approach gives two other interesting results.
Theorem 10 (Ambainis [1]). The probability structure of PFIN is decidable; i.e. there
is an algorithm that receives two probabilities p1 and p2 and answers whether 〈p1〉
PFIN= 〈p2〉PFIN.
Theorem 11 (Ambainis [1]). Let p∈PPFIN. Then; there is a k such that [pk; k]PFIN=
〈p〉PFIN.
Thus, teams of diCerent size can have diCerent learning power (the counterpart of
Theorem 2 in [8]) but we always have the “best” team size such that team of this size
can simulate any probabilistic machine (and hence, team of any other size with the
same success ratio).
Finally, it is also possible to determine the precise ordering type of the probability
hierarchy. Table 1 shows how the complexity of the ordering increases when proba-
bilities decrease.
! is the ordering type corresponding to a single in)nite sequence ( 23 ;
3
5 ;
4
7 ; : : :), k!
is the ordering type of a set consisting of k in)nite sequences. !2 is the ordering type
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Table 1
Interval Ordering type of the probability hierarchy
[ 12 ; 1] !
[ 49 ; 1] 2!
[ 37 ; 1] 3!
[ 25 ; 1] !
2
[ 38 ; 1] !
3
[ 13 ; 1] !
!
[ 14 ; 1] !
!!
[0; 1] 0
of a set consisting of in)nite sequence of sequences and !3 is the ordering type of
an in)nite sequence of !2-type sets. !! is the limit of !;!2; !3; : : : . Further ordering
types can be de)ned similarly [33, 24]. The last one, 0, is the limit of
!;!!; !!
!
; : : :
and is considered to be so big that it is hard to )nd any intuitive description for it. 1
This shows that the explored part of PFIN-hierarchy (the interval [ 37 ; 1], the ordering
type 3!) is very simple compared to the entire hierarchy. This result can also be
considered as a partial explanation why it is unrealistic to )nd explicit values for all
points in the probability hierarchy.
6. General results for FIN?
An easy corollary of results in [1] is
Theorem 12. If 〈p1〉PFIN = 〈p2〉PFIN; then 〈p1〉FIN = 〈p2〉FIN.
Thus, any diagonalization argument that works for PFIN will work for FIN as well.
This means that the probability hierarchy for FIN is at least as complicated as for
PFIN. (In fact, it is more complicated because there are points (like 2449 ) that are not
contained in the PFIN hierarchy but appear in the FIN hierarchy.)
There have been several attempts to move beyond explicit probabilities and to )nd
general proof methods for FIN. Daley and Kalyanasundaram [9, 10] have developed
a set of reduction arguments (techniques to reduce the problems about inclusions for
smaller probabilities to already solved problems for inclusion at bigger probabilities).
These arguments were essential for proving Theorem 4. They were also able to explain
1 It is also known [33] that 0 is the ordering type of the set of all expressions possible in )rst-order
arithmetic but this does not look very relevant to our inductive inference result.
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“the strange probabilities” of Theorem 3. Yet, the number of cases they had to handle
is huge and, for further progress, even more general techniques are necessary.
Similar reduction arguments for PFIN [8] were the foundation for general results of
[1]. So, we may expect that methods of [10] could serve as a foundation for similar
results for FIN.
Another approach was taken by Apsitis [6], Apsitis et al. [7], Ambainis et al. [4],
who de)ned asymmetric teams, a generalization of usual teams. Ambainis et al. [3]
showed that a more general result about asymmetric teams (well-quasi-orderedness)
would imply well-orderedness and decidability of the FIN-hierarchy. They also claimed
a proof of well-quasi-orderedness for asymmetric FIN teams. However, a bug was
discovered in this proof and it turned out that asymmetric FIN-teams are not well-
quasi-ordered [6]. This suggests that, if it is possible to prove a counterpart of results
in Section 5 for FIN, then the proof should use properties that are speci)c to traditional
teams.
7. Other problems about FIN and PFIN
Besides )nding the cutpoints, there are other problems about probabilistic and team
learning that are worth studying. One of them relates probabilistic and team learning
to oracle computation.
Assume that we have two teams (or probabilistic machines) and one of them is
weaker than the other. If we allow the weaker team (probabilistic machine) to ac-
cess some oracle (for example, K , the oracle for the halting problem), we increase
the power of this team and it may be able to learn everything that the stronger team
can learn. Kummer [22] 2 studied the following problem: given a; b; c; d such that
[a; b]FIN* [c; d]FIN, what is the class of oracles A such that [a; b]FIN⊆ [c; d]FIN[A]?
([c; d]FIN[A] denotes the collection of sets of functions that are identi)able by a
[c; d]FIN-team with access to oracle A).
We summarize his results in two theorems below. The )rst theorem partitions a; b; c; d
into such that [a; b]FIN⊆ [c; d]FIN[A] for some A and such that [a; b]FIN* [c; d]
FIN[A] for all A. It also shows that, whenever A exists, the halting oracle K can be
used as A.
Theorem 13 (Kummer [22]). (1) If there is k ∈N such that m=n6 1k¡m′=n′; then
[m; n]FIN* [m′; n′]FIN[A] for any oracle A.
(2) If 1=(k + 1)¡m=n and m′=n′61=k for some k; then [m; n]FIN⊆ [m′; n′]FIN[A]
for any A such that K6T A (i.e.; the halting oracle K is Turing-reducible to A).
The second theorem considers the question whether oracles weaker than K can be
used as A in some cases. For this result, we need some extra de)nitions.
2 Related problems about oracles have been also studied in [13, 23].
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Let M1; M2; : : : be an enumeration of all Turing machines and ’i be the partial
function computed by Mi.
Denition 9. PA denotes the set of all oracles A such that given A, there is a function
f(x; y) that is computable with the oracle A and:
1. If ’x(y)= 0 or ’x(y)= 1, then f(x; y)=’x(y).
2. Otherwise, f(x; y) can be anything but it must be de)ned (even if ’x(y) is un-
de)ned).
In other words, an oracle in PA can be used to extend any partial recursive function
to a total recursive function that is consistent with the original function. Equivalently,
PA can be de)ned as the set of all oracles A that are Turing-equivalent to a com-
plete and consistent extension of Peano arithmetic [22, 19, 28]. If K reduces to A, then
A∈PA. However, the converse is not true [28].
Theorem 14 (Kummer [22]). (1) Let m; n be such that [m; n]PFIN* [m′; n′]PFIN.
Then; [m; n]PFIN⊆ [m′; n′]PFIN[A] if and only if [m; n]FIN⊆ [m′; n′]FIN[A] if and
only if K6T A.
(2) [24; 49]FIN⊆ [1; 2]FIN[A] if and only if A∈PA.
Thus, we see that a weaker oracle may suNce because there are A∈PA such that K
is not Turing-reducible to A [28]. Kummer [22] asked whether these two possibilities
(we need an oracle A such that K6T A or any A∈PA suNces) are the only ones. We
have a partial answer [2].
Denition 10. PA′ denotes the set of all oracles A such that given A, there is a function
f(x; y) that is computable with an oracle A with the following properties:
1. If ’x(y)= 0 or ’x(y)= 1, then f(x; y)=’x(y).
2. Otherwise, f(x; y) can be anything but it must be de)ned (even if ’x(y) is un-
de)ned).
3. If, for some x, there is at most one y such that ’x(y)= 1, then f(x; y)= 1 for at
most one y.
Theorem 15 (Ambainis [2]). For any a; b; c; d such that [a; b]FIN* [c; d]FIN; the set
of oracles A such that [a; b]FIN⊆ [c; d]FIN[A] is one of the following:
1: The empty set.
2: The set of all A such that K6T A.
3: PA (see De2nition 9).
4: PA′ (see De2nition 10).
It is easy to see that PA⊆PA′ ⊆{A : K6T A}. However, we do not know whether
PA′ coincides with PA, {A : K6T A} or is diCerent from both of them.
Other properties of the probability hierarchy deserve studying as well. For example,
Ambainis [1] asked how close are points of the PFIN-hierarchy one to another.
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Question 1 (Ambainis [1]). Is it true that there is a constant c¿1 such that every
interval [x; y]⊆ [1=n; 1=(n−1)] with y− x¿(1=c)n contains atleast one point from the
PFIN-hierarchy?
A similar question can be asked about FIN.
8. Other paradigms of inductive inference
Similar problems can be studied for other paradigms of inductive inference (besides
FIN). One of the most interesting open cases is probabilistic language learning in
the limit. In language learning, the object to be learned is a recursively enumerable
language L. The standard presentation for the language is a text.
Denition 11 (Gold [15]). (a) A text T for a language L is an enumeration (in any
order) of all words in L.
(b) A learning machine M TxtEx-identi)es a language L, if given any text T for L
as an input, it outputs a sequence of grammars g1; g2; : : : such that gi = gi+1 = gi+2 = · · ·
and gi recognizes L, for some i∈N.
(c) A set U of languages is called TxtEx-identi)able (identi)able in the limit) if
there is a machine M that TxtEx-identi)es every L∈U . TxtEx denotes the collection
of all TxtEx-learnable sets.
Note that M does not get any information about the words not in L. This is the
biggest diCerence between inductive inference of functions and languages. If f(x) =y,
M knows that after receiving f(x). If a word x is not in L, M never knows it because
this may be the case that x∈L but it has not appeared in the input yet.
The probability hierarchy for TxtEx has been studied by Jain and Sharma [17].
Below, we summarize their main results. The )rst theorem concerns the probability
at which a probabilistic machine becomes stronger than a deterministic one. Similarly
to PFIN or FIN, it is 23 . However, the similarities end once the next point in the
probability hierarchy is revealed. It is 58 (instead of
3
5 ). It remains open what are the
next points below 58 .
Theorem 16 (Jain and Sharma [17]). (a) If p¿ 23 ; then 〈p〉TxtEx=TxtEx.
(b) [2; 3]TxtEx =TxtEx.
(c) If 58¡p6
2
3 ; then 〈p〉TxtEx = [2; 3]TxtEx.
(d) [5; 8]TxtEx = [2; 3]TxtEx.
The second theorem concerns relationships between teams of diCerent size at proba-
bility 12 . Teams of diCerent size may have diCerent learning power (similarly to FIN or
PFIN). Also similarly to PFIN and FIN, all [n; 2n]-team sizes for odd n were equivalent.
However, for even n results were no longer the same as for FIN or PFIN.
Theorem 17 (Jain and Sharma [17]). (1) [1; 2]TxtEx = [2; 4]TxtEx.
(2) [1; 2]TxtEx= [3; 6]TxtEx= [5; 10]TxtEx= : : : :
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(3) For all i¿0; [2i ; 2i+1]TxtEx = [2i+1; 2i+2]TxtEx.
(4) For all k; [k; 2k]TxtEx = 〈 12 〉TxtEx.
In both cases, we see that there both similarities with FIN and diCerences. We think
that it can be very interesting to study this hierarchy. However, before general results
are proved, it may be necessary to get a better knowledge of explicit probabilities and
to accumulate more proof techniques.
9. Conclusions and related work
We surveyed the work in probabilistic inductive inference, with an emphasis on re-
cent work for FIN and PFIN. For good surveys about earlier results, see [5, 29] for
inductive inference in general and [35, 16] for probabilistic inductive inference.
The biggest challenge in the area remains obtaining general results about the prob-
ability hierarchy for unrestricted FIN. In Section 6, we mentioned several approaches
to this problem. None of them has been completely successful but there is a chance
that these ideas can be extended, giving more insight about unrestricted FIN. There
are other interesting problems about FIN that deserve studying as well (like FIN with
oracles, Section 7).
Besides FIN, probability hierarchies for other learning models can be studied. Prob-
abilistic language learning [17] in the limit is the most interesting among those. Other
recently studied models are probabilistic language learning with monotonicity restric-
tions [26] and probabilistic learning up to a small set of errors [37].
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